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Torture and the War on Terror: The Need for
Consistent Definitions and Legal Remedies
Linda Carter*
The last few years have brou ght fort h images that will, unfortunately,
stay with us for a long time - Abu Ghraib, waterboarding, extraordinary
renditi ons, and torture memos from the Bush admi nistration . The harm
from these actions to individuals, to internati ona l relations, and to the law is
still unfolding. But there has also been time to begin an evaluation of what
went wron g, and what can be done within the United States and
internationally to remedy and to prevent abuses in the future.
While the United States has made some progress on undoing the harm
from the legal interpret ations of the Bush admin istration (such as the
McCain Amendment prohibiting cruel, inhuman, or degradin g treatment or
punishment and President Obama' s renunciation of certain interrogat ion
techniques). the legal remedies for torture within the United States remain
rather limited.
Among other approaches, the conv iction s in Italy of American and
Italian intelligence agents for an abduction that resulted in a rendition to
Egypt are a significant and needed part of the accountability for torture.
The mixture of Italian and American agents and three countries is also
indicative of another impor tant fact to keep in mind. Neither the war on
terror nor torture respect s borders. A multinati onal effo rt is essential to
achieve accountability.
In this article , I will address two que stions related to definitions and
accountability. First , why is there a need for a consistent definition? One
lesson from the Bush administration torture memos is the danger of
differin g definitions. Thi s question will be explored by comparing the U.S.
approa ch with that of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY). Other places to look for definitions includ e other
nationa l Jaws and international bodie s monitoring torture issues. Some
examples from those sour ces will also be discussed. The seco nd question
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is: What are the current limitations on available remedies that impede
consistent accountability for torture? In discussing this question , I will
examine criminal and civil options in the United States and in the
international criminal tribunal s as examples of what we have and what we
lack.
The first section will provide background information on the
Convention Again st Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Puni shment, statutory law in the United States, and
interpretations in the juri sprudence of the ICTY. The definitional
differences will be explored, including the saga of the memo s from the
Bush administration. In particular, the discussion will focus on mens rea,
which has not been analyzed in the same depth as the definitlon of torture,
but which is a powerful element in accountability. The secon d section will
explain howthe definitional differences create problems, with a focus on
international relations and accountability. In the third section, criminal and
civil accountabilit y mechanisms and limitations on those vehicles will be
explored. In addition, alternatives to criminal or civil actions directly based
on torture will be examined. These include prosecutions for underlying or
related conduct, such as kidnapping or aggravated assa ult. This section will
conclude with observations about next steps to take toward greater
con sistency and accountability.
Two preliminary observations should be kept in mind as the issues are
discuss ed. First , criminal prosecutions for torture arise in different types of
crimes. National juri sdiction s are likely to have a crime that is labeled
"torture." In the international criminal tribunal s, however, there is no
indepe ndent crime of torture . Instead , torture may be punished as a crime
aga inst humanity or as a war crime. The acts that constitute torture might
also be penalized in national juri sdictions as assault, maltreatment of
prisoners, murder , and similar more common crimes . It is important to
rememb er that, when we talk about "torture," there are multiple crimes that
might cover the conduct. Secondly, it is essential that national courts play a
strong role in prosecuting torture . There is no specialized internation al
court for torture prosecution s. The internation al criminal tribunals are
limited in jurisdiction, hearing relatively few cases. Moreover, as already
indicated , the international criminal tribunals can prosecute torture only in
the context of crimes agai nst humanity and war crimes, each of which carry
additional and more complicated elements than the basic crime of torture.
National courts are further critical to civil re medies for torture. There is no
internation al court that is char ged with awarding damages for torture.
There is, however, an internation al treaty with a statement of what
constitutes torture, which is discu ssed in the next section.
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l. DEFINrTJONS OF TORTURE

A. The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The Torture Convention was opened for signature in 1984 and entered
into force in 1987. The definition of torture from Article 1 has five key
1
elements.
Torture means any act by which
l.

(Harm): "severe pain or suffering , whether physical or mental ,"

2.

(Mens rea): "is intentionally inflicted on a person"

3.

(Enumerated purpo ses): "for such purposes as obtaining from
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing
him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him
or a third person, or for any reason ba sed on discrimination of
any kind,''

4 . (State action ): "when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at
the inst igation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity."
5. (Except for lawful sanctions): Torture "does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions."
Two parts of the definition are the focu s of this article, harm (the
meaning of severe physical or mental pain or suffering) and mens rea (the
meaning of of "intentionally intlicted").i

I.

Article I ( I) provides in full:
For the purpo ses of thi s Convention. the term '·torture· • means any act by
which severe pain or sufferin g, whether physic al or menial, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtainin g from him or a third
person information or a confe ssion, punishing him for an act he or a third
person has co mmi tted or is suspected of having committ ed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person. or for any reason based on discrimination of
any kind. when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the cons ent or acqui escence of a public official or other person acting in
an official capacity . It does not includ e pain or sufferin g arising only from,
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanc tions.
Convention against Torture and Oth er Cr ue l, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Puni shment , Dec. 10, 1984. 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention].
2. Highly relevant to any discussion of torture, but beyond the scope of this article , is
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The Convention play s a highly significant role in the development of
national definitions of torture. The United States and 149 other countries
1
are parties to the Torture Convention: As is typical with regard to human
rights treaties, the United States attached reservations and understandings to
its ratification of the Convention, and the federal statute adopted to
implement the Convention, took into account a key reservation and a key
understanding .
B. The Definition of Torture in the United State./

Differences in definition can arise if the language of the statute is
different from the Torture Convention. Difference s can also arise if the
identical language is interpreted in different ways. The experience of the
United States is an example of both ways of deviating from other
definitions.
Comparing the key elements of the U.S. federal criminal statutory
5
definition with the key elements listed above in the Convention , we find
the following limitations in the statute:
the Torture Convention 's stand on condu ct that is less than tortur e, but constitutes cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Unfortunat ely, there is no definition of that
concept, nor is there the same ob ligation to criminalize or provid e compensation. The
Convention states that that each State Party shall " undertak e to prevent in any territory
under its juri sdic tion other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
which do not amount to torture as defin ed in article I. " This is clearly an area calling for
future development. but at a minimum, there sho uld be co mplian ce with the requirement s
related lo torture itself.
3. Sec Tonure Convention, http://treaties.un.org/PagesNiewDetail s.aspx?src=UNT
SONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_n0=IV -9&chapter=4&1ang=en#Participants.
4 . When ratifying the Torture Convention, the United States attach ed two key
pro vis ions that limit its reach. The first is a reserva tion stating that cruel , inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment includ es only " the cruel, unu sual and inhumane treatment
or puni ,hment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Am endments to the
Consti tution of the United States." This is important , but not the focus of this article. The
more pertinent limitation is the understa nding regarding the definition of torture.
5. The complete definition s contained in the fede ral torture statute. 18 U.S.C. §2340
(2006 ), are as follow s:
( 1) "tortur e·· means an act committed by a person acting under the color of law
speci fically intended to inflict severe physi cal or mental pain or suffering (other
than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within
his custody or physical control;
(2) "severe mental pain or suffering" means the prolonged mental harm caused by
or rcsulling from(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or
suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or
application, of mind- altering subs tance s or other procedures calc ulated to
disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or
(D) the threat that another person will imminently he subjected to death,
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I. (Harm ): Limitation on mental harm.

Se vere mental pain or suffering means prolonged ment al harm from
• Intention al or threatened infli ction of severe phys ica l pain or
suffering
• Use of mind-alterin g substances calcul ated to disrupt profo undl y
the sen ses or the personality
• Threat of imminent death , or
• Thre at that another person will imm inently suff er death, severe
harm , or mid- altering substan ces.
2 . (Men s rea): An act "specifically intended" to inflict the required
harm .
3. (Enum erated purposes ): No change.
4 . (State action ): The act is committed "by a person actin g under the
color of law" and " upon another per so n within his custody or
phy sica l control. "
5. (Exc ept for lawful sanction s): "o ther than pain or suffering inciden tal
to lawful sancti ons"
The two most cr itical comparisons be tween the federal torture statute
and th e languag e of the Torture Con ventio n involve the phra ses "severe
mental pain or suffering" and "specifically intended."
In order to
understand the questions genera ted by this language, it is import ant to
con sider the so-c alled "tortu re memos" promul gated during the Bush
admini stration , where the definition s stand tod ay, and a comp arison with
the j uri sprudence of the JCTY.

seve re physical pain or sufferin g. or the admini strati on or appli cation of
mind-altering substances or other procedures calcul ated to disrupt profoundly
the senses or personality; and
(3) " United States" mea ns the several States of the United States, the District of
Columbi a, and the commo nwealths, terr itories, and possessions of the United
States.
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C. Definitions of Torture: A Comparison of the United States and the ICTY
on the Meaning of Sev ere Harm and Intent

I. The meaning of "severe [physical] pain or suffering "
After 9/11 and the seizure of individuals in Afghanistan, issues arose
regarding interrogation techniques. In a series of memos , lawyers in the
Justice Department set forth their legal opinions of the reach of
international law and the meaning of torture.
In a memorandum prepared during the Bush administration in 2002
under the authority of Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee (the "Bybee
memo"), severe physical pain or suffering was defined as damage that rises
to "the level that would ordinarily be associated with a sufficiently serious
physical condition or injury such as death, organ failure, or serious
6
impairment of body functions." This definition would exclude many forms
of physical harm, such as beatings that are not quite as serious as imminent
death, waterboarding, or electrocution that does not threaten death. In
comparison to the ICTY's definition, it is highly limited in what is included
as sufficient harm for torture.
1
The ICTY has explicitly rejected the standard in the Bybee memo. The
defense in Prosecutor v. Brdjanin had argued that the standard in the Bybee
memo was customary international law. The Court rejected this standard
and defined severe physical pain or suffering in a much broader way,
stating that "the objective severity of the harm inflicted must be considered,
including the nature, purpose, and consistency of the acts committed.
Subjective criteria, such as the physical or mental condition of the victim,
the effect of the treatment and, in some cases , factors such as the victim's
age, sex, state of health , and position of inferiority will also be relevant in
assessing the gravity of the harm. Permanent injury is not a requirement for
torture; evidence of the suffering need not even be visible after the
8
commission of the crime." Moreover, in Prosecutor v. Kunarac the ICTY
9
held that rape is per se torture. Although the U.S. definition in the Bybee
memo was extreme, the meaning of severe physical harm in the U.S. has
edged closer to the ICTY's. Even before President Bush left office, his
Administration had backtracked on the incredibly limited definition of
physical pain or suffering related to organ failure. A 2004 memo, written
6. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Dep 't of Ju stice Office of Legal Coun sel , to
Alb erto R. Gonzales, Coun sel to the President , Standard ~ of Conductfor Interr ogatio11under
18 U.S.C §§2340-2340A (Aug . 1, 2002 ), at 6, available ot http: //www .ju stice. gov /olc/
doc s/m emo -gonzale s-au g2002 .pdf [hereinafter By bee Memornndum ].
7. Pro secut or v. Brdj anin, Ca se No. lT -99-36-A , Appeals Judgm ent, Tl[244-248
(April 23 , 2007).
8. Id. '1!242.
9. Prosecutor v. Kunara c, Case No. IT-96-23 & 23-lA, Appeals Judgment , Cflll (June
12, 2002).
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by Acting Assistant Attorney General Daniel Levin in the Office of Legal
Counsel, clarified that "severe" does not include only "excruciating and
agonizing pain or suffering." According to the memo, it means "a
10
condition of some extended duration or persistence as well as intensity."
This definition presumably brought the United States closer to the intended
11
meaning of the Convention and to the ICTY ' s interpretation.
More developments were to follow that also moved the U.S. closer to
the general definhion. As soon as President Obama took office, he issued
an executive order rescinding all of the earlier memos and declaring that the
U.S. Army Field Manual standards for interrogation would apply. 12 As of
13
today , waterboarding is prohibited, as are:
Forcing the detainee to be naked, perf orrn sexual acts, or pose in a
sexual manner.
Placing hoods or sacks over the head of a detainee; using duct tape
over the eyes.
Applying beatings, electric shock, burns, or other forms of physical
pain.
Using military working dogs.
Inducing hypothermia or heat injury.
Conducting mock executions.
Depriving the detainee of necessary food, water, or medical care.
With the reversion back to the Army Field Manual , the U.S.
understanding of severe physical pain or suffering seems in line with the
meaning given the phrase by other sources such as the U.N. Special

10. Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Asst. Att ' y Gen., to James B. Corney,
Deputy Att'y Gen., Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Dec . 30,
2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/l8usc23402340a2.htm
[hereinafter Levin
Memorandum].
11. J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELlUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
AGAINSTTORTURE: A HANDBOOKON THE CONVENTIONAGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER
CRUEL, INHt:MANOR DEGRADINGTREATMEl'-TOR PUNISHMEITT
44 , 117 (1988) (drafters
considered, but rejected, language that would have required a grea ter degree of pain or
suffering, such as "extreme pain or suff ering" or "systematic" pain or suffering).
12. Ensuring Law ful Interr ogatio ns, Exec. Order No. 13,49 1, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,893 (Ja n.
22, 2009). A special task force was also created and asked to provide recommendation s.
The task force essentially found that the Army Field Manual wa s co1Tect law. Pre ss Rele ase,
U.S. Dep ' t of Justice. Special Task Force on Interro gation s and Tran sfer Polici es Issue s Its
Recommendation s to the President (Aug . 24 , 2009), availahle at http://www.ju slice .
gov /o pa!pr/2009/ Augu st/09 - ag-835. html.
13. Army Field Manual 2-22.3: Human Intelli ge nce Collector Operations , at 5-75
(Sep t. 6, 2006) , available at hup://library .enlisted.info /fiel d-m anua ls/se ries- l/FM2 _ 22.3/F M
2-22.3 .pdf.
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Rapporteur and cases from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
and the Human Rights Committee (HRC).
For example, according to the Special Rapporteur, torture includes
"beatings; extraction of nails, teeth, etc.; burns; electric shocks; suspension;
suffocation; exposure to excessive light or noise; sexual aggression;
administration of drugs in detention or psychiatric institutions; prolonged
denial of rest or sleep; prolonged denial of food; prolonged denial of
sufficient hygiene; prolonged denial of medical assistance; total isolation
and sensory deprivation; being kept in constant uncertainty in terms of
space and time; threats to torture or kill relatives; total abandonment; and
simulated executions.""
The Human Rights Committee has found torture existed with "beatings ,
electric shocks to the genitals, mock executions, deprivation of food and
water, and the 'thumb press"' and also in cases of "systematic beatings ,
electroshocks , burns, extended hanging from hand and/or leg chains,
repeated immersion in a mixture of blood, urine, vomit and excrement
( 'submarino '), standing for great lengths of time, and simulated executions
1
or amputation s amounted to torture.' ' 'Similarly, in cases brought under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and the
Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA), U.S. courts have found that
allegations state a cause of action for torture when there are threats of
1
imminent death, severe beatings and Russian roulette; '' being held without
notification of charges for 27 day s, beaten severely, stripped of clothing,
and forced to witness the sexual assault of a friend that resulted in
17
hemorrhaging;
and a combination of being held in unsanitary conditions,
18
chained, blindfolded, little clothing, poor food, and threats of death.
Consequently, while the variant definition of severe physical pain or
suffering in the torture memos received major attention in the media and in
the academic literature, today the U.S. interpretation is essentially
consistent with the meaning in the ICTY cases and other sources. Instead,
the U.S . is presently more divergent with the meaning of severe mental pain
or suffering and especially with the meaning of spe cifically intended.
14.

BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL L AW AND !TS

ENFORCEME1'T 563 (2d. ed. 2010) (quoting

Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture,
U.N. Doc . No. E/CN.4 /J986/15, <ii19 (1986)).
15. Prosecutor v. Kvocka. Ca se No. IT-98-3011-T. Judgment, 'l\146 (Nov. 2 , 2001)
(citing to dec isions of the Human Right s Committee in case s involving Zaire Uruguay , am.I
Bolivia) .
16. Mehinovic v. Vuckovic , 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (judgment for
Bosnian Muslim plaintiffs against Bosnian Serb officer under ATS and TVPA for phy s ical
and mental torture).
17. Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (default judgment ent ered for
Chines e and foreign individuals as plaintiffs under TVPA; however. recommendation was
for declarat ory relief only due to act of state doctrine).
18. Surrette v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 231 F. Supp. 2d. 260, 264 (D.D.C . 2002)
(CIA offic e r Buckley died in captivity after such mi streatm ent).
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2. The me(lning of "se1•ere [mental/ pain or suJfering"

The definition of severe mental pain or suffering in the U.S. statute is
limited in two ways. First, the U.S. added in the adjective "prolonged."
Secondly, the U.S. statute, like the understanding attached to the ratification
of the Convention, refers to severe mental pain or suffering caused by one
of four events, described earlier, involving threat of severe physical harm or
infliction or threat of severe physical pain or suffering , use of mind-altering
substances, or threats of imminent death, or threats that another person will
be subjected to similar mistreatment. Neither of these limitations is present
in the jurisprudence of the ICTY.
The key question is whether the more limited definition would make a
difference in application. The answer is possibly not in many situations.
One of the four categories is "the intentional infliction or threatened
infliction of severe physical pain or suffering," which would presumably
cover many situations. On the other hand, mental pain or suffering must be
"prolonged," which could preclude a finding of torture if there is no
continuing psychological trauma from a method such as waterboarding or
electrocution. Moreover, it is worth asking whether rape would be included
as torture under this definition as interpreted by the United States. Rape
might not necessarily be the result of a threat or infliction of severe physical
pain or death. It is not clear that the act of rape itself would be viewed as
severe physical pain or suffering under this definition.
In contrast, rape clearly would be torture under the ICTY jurisprudence.
In Prosecutor v. Kunarac , the ICTY Appeals Chamber stated: "Sexual
violem:e necessarily gives rise to severe pain or suffering, whether physical
1
or mental, and in this way justifies its characterization as an act of torture. " ')
Thus, the limitations in the U.S. definitions could be a source of difference
with the ICTY or other nations that do not have similar restrictions on
mental harm.
Even if the U.S. definitions are closer now to the ICTY's, the lesson of
the torture memos is the potential for differential meanings of severity of
harm and resulting difference in application. An even more striking area
for differential applications of the meaning of torture occurs with regard to
the mens rea required to find a violation.
3. The meaning of "specifically intended"

The U.S. statute, again tracking the understanding that the U.S. attached
to the Convention, provides that torture is committed when the perpetrator
"specifically intended'' the severe pain or suffering. This is different
19. Prosecutor v. Kunarac. Case No. IT-96-23 & 2~- IA, Appeals Judgment. '11150
(June 12. 2002).
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wording from the Convention , which uses the phrase "intentionally
inflicted." Note that this is a different issue than whether the intentional
infliction of pain or suffering is done for the purpose of obtaining
confession, punishment, intimidation, coercion, or discrimination - the
purposes stated in the Torture Convention and in some national statutes.
Here, the issue is the mens rea to commit the act of inflicting severe pain or
suffering.
The question that arises is what happens if the accused intends the
action that causes the severe harm, but does not subjectively intend that
level of harm? This could occur when the victim reacts more severely than
anticipated. For example, suppose the interrogator electrocutes the victim,
expecting that the victim will feel in pain and highly uncomfortable, but not
expecting that the person will suffer severe pain or die from his injuries. Or
suppose that the accused intends to rape the victim, but does not intend or
know that the victim will have long-lasting mental dysfunction as a result.
Under the U.S. definition, these individuals would arguably have a defense
based on the mens rea required.
In the early Bu sh administration memo, the position was clear that
persons without a specific intent to inflict severe pain or suffering would
not be guilty of torture. While evidence of knowledge in criminal law is
often strong circumstantial evidence of intent, the 2002 Bush administration
20
memo took the position that knowledge was insufficient.
In the later
Levin memo, it is unclear whether there was any lessening of this
understanding. The 2004 memo examined specific intent, and indicated
that "it would not be appropriate to rely on parsing the specific intent
element of the statute to approve as lawful conduct that might otherwise
amount to torture." The Levin memo referred to the distinction made in the
2002 Bybee memo between the severe harm as the "precise objective" of
the defendant and where the defendant "act[s] with knowledge that such
pain 'was reasonably likely to result from his actions.'" In a footnote, the
memo states that the Office of Legal Counsel "[does] not reiterate that test
21
here."
Beyo nd this somewhat cryptic rejection of the Bybee memo,
however, the Levin memo does not clearly indicate that knowledge is
sufficient to satisfy the element of "specifically intended." The Levin
memo merely indicates that a person acting in "good faith" that his conduct
would not be torture has neither the "specific intent" nor "knowledge or
21
The
notice'' that the conduct would result in severe pain or suffering.
memo does not clearly repudiate the earlier Bybee memo understanding of
mens rea.
The issue whether knowledge or notice is a sufficient mens rea is highly
significant if the perpetrator is acting with awareness but not the conscious
20.
21.
22.

Bybee Memorandum, supra note 6, at 3.
Levin Memorandum, supra note I 0, at n.27.
Levin Memorandum, supra note 10.

2012]

TORTURE AND THEW AR ON TERROR

301

purpose to achieve the harm. For example, if there are multiple perpetrators
involve d in shocking a prisoner with electricity, one perpetrator might know
what is occurring and participate in some way, and yet not specifically
intend the result of severe pain or suffering. This perpetrator would satisfy a
knowledge standard, but would not likely be found to po ssess specific
intent. It is unclear from the Levin memo whether or not such a perpetrator
is guilty of torture. The Obama administration has yet to clarify where it
stands on this issue and, in the meantime, U.S. courts have been interpreting
the standard to require the higher mens rea.
In contrast, the ICTY has clearly stated that intent means "a perpetrat or
intended to act in a way which, in the normal course of event s, would cause
23
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental , to his victims."
Presumably under this definition, the person electrocuting or raping an
2
ind ividual would meet the intent requirement. •
The ICTY's definiti on is a better interpretat ion of the Convention
because the Convention's language separates the requirement of severe
harm from the statement that it must be "intentionally inflicted .., The
legislative intent also supports the ICTY's interpretation. The legislative
history of the Convention shows that the drafters wanted to exclude
negligence or accident, not the lesser gradations of a subjective mens rea. 25
This is further evident from the rejection of a higher mens rea The United
States had wanted the higher mens rea of "deliberately and maliciously" as
the mens rea for inflicting the harm. This was reject ed in the drafting.
Despite the likelihood that the U.S. definition is at odds with the
language and meaning in the Convention , the U.S. did attach an
under standing with the "specifically intended" language and U.S. courts are
using the narrower mens rea in immigration removal or deportation cases.
The federal courts are fairly uniform in finding that a "specific intent to
inflict severe pain or suffering" is neces sary to a finding of torture. For
example, in January 2010, in Cherichel v. United States, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the specific intent
interpretation in a case involving a Haitian national who claimed that he
would be subjec t to torture in a Haitian prison because of the pri son
conditions of lack of hygiene, lack of food and water, severe overcrowding,
being detained indefinitely , and in this individual' s specific case, being
identified as an "American" because he had spent most of his life in the
23. Prosecutor v. Kunarac. Case No. IT-96-23 & 23-IA. Appeals Judgment, '![153
(Jun e 12, 2002).
24. See also Gail H. Miller, Defining To11ure,Floersheimer Center Occasional Paper# 3, at
13 (2005), available ar http://www.cardozo .yu.edu/cms/uploadedFiles/FLOERSHEIMER/
Defining %20TortW"e.pdf(describing intent requirement of the ECHR as shifting the burden of
proof to the government, creating a presumption of intent).
25. BURGER S & DANEUUS, supra note 11, at 118 (1988): MANFlUiD NOWAK & ELIZABETH
M CA RTHUR, THE UNITED NATIONS CONV ENTION AGAJNST TOR1URE : A COMMENTARY 74 (2008).
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United States . The petitioner was seeking to preclude his removal to Haiti
on the basis of the Torture Conventi on. The Court found that there was
insufficient evidence that the Haitian authorities would "s pecifically intend"
to inflict severe pain and suffering on the person even thoug h the severe
harm might in fact be imposed. The courts interpret "specific intent" to
mean an intent to achieve the result - in this case, the severe pain and
suffering. An intent to commit the act of imprisoning the person under
these condition s with the foreseeable effect of severe pain and suffering is
insufficient under this definition. Th e court further noted spec ifically that
knowledge that the severe pain and suffering would occur was insufficient. 27
Under the ICTY definition of intent, however , it is likely that the
Haitian situation would be torture, since incarcerating a person in a prison
under those conditions would be an intentional act, the normal consequence
of which is going to be severe harm.
The interpre tation of "specifi cally intended" could be less significant,
and the conclusion of torture would mirror the ICTY' s co nclusion , if the
underlying acts of torture are parti cular ly horrific. In another recent case in
the Third Circuit, the court reversed a decision of the Board of Immigrati on
Appeals, finding that a Chinese citizen of Korean ancestry would be subje ct
to torture if returned to China.~" The petitioner, Jinyu Kang , was named in
an arrest warrant along with two others in China for assisting North Korean
refugee s who had illegally entered China. Kang presented evidence that the
other two had been subjected to beatin gs, partial suffocation from bags over
their heads, sleep deprivation , forced kneeling or forced hanging off the
ground, electroc ution , and other mistre atment. Moreover, an Americ an
who was detained in China for 48 months described observing similar
mistreatment of prisoners. Kang' s own son, who had been interrogated
about his mother' s whereabout s after she fled China , was abused by sleep
deprivation, slapping, and hair pulling. The Third Circuit rejected the
federal government's argument s that Kang had failed, as in Cherfr :hel, to
prove specific intent. Here , the Court stated Kang had proved that she
would more likely than not be subjected to the same brutality as her two
accomplices , and that the abuse would be for the "p urpose of causing her
20
severe pain and suffering. The Court went even further, chastising the

26. Cherichel v. Holder, 59 1 F.3 d 1002 (8th Cir. 2010) . Cerf. de11inl, 131 S. Ct. 74
(2010 ). See aim Yillt:gas v. Muk ascy, 523 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2()08) (finding that , eve n if
conditi o ns in Mexican mental institutions were inhuman e, petitio ner fai led to sho w that
authoriti es specifica lly intended the harm) .
27. Cherichel, 591 F.3d at 1011.
28 . Kang v. Attorney General, 611 F.3 d 157 (3rd Cir. 2010) .
29. Id. at 166- 167. See also Co le v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 774 (9th Cir. 2011)
(remandin g for determination of whether Honduran offi cial s would intentionally withhold
necessa ry medical treatment becau se peti tioner was tattooed with ga ng insig nia ); Eneh v.
Hold er, 601 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2010) (remanding for determin atio n o f whether petitioner had
e~tablished that Nige rian officia ls would speci fically intend to deprive him of necessary
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federal government for seeking to send Kang back to China when the
evidence of torture was so clear. The Court stated:
It is disappointing, even shockin g, that the government fail s to
acknowledge that the evidence is not only strong ly in Kang's favor ,
but, indeed , compels the conclusion that she will likely be tortured.
An attorney representing the United States "carries a double
30
burden.' '
It may be that the meaning of specific intent is open to new
interpretation. While not directly addressed in the executive orders that
repudiated the Bush memos and substituted the Army Field Manual, there is
a clear signal that the U.S. is moving towards a more generally accepted
understanding of torture. Given the varied definitions of specific intent
within U.S. law, it would be possible to construe the phrase to mean that the
individual specifically intended the act that constituted the severe harm
(e.g., electrocution , rape, breaking bones), but did not have to intend
subjectively the severe nature of the harm. It should be of concern that,
with a more narrowly defin ed mens rea, the U.S. definitions will continue to
be more limited in covering acts than the ICTY definition and more limited
than what was likel y intended by the Torture Convention.
Especially with regard to mental, rather than physical, harm, the narrow
view of the mens rea of specific intent could pre vent a torture conviction for
many actions that in fact cause long term mental harm, but where the
perpetrator claims that he or she did not consciously desire that result. For
example, even if the act of rape constituted severe physical or mental pain
or suffering under the U.S. definition, a perp etrator could possibly
exculpate himself by demonstrating that he did not consciously intend that
result.
Under the ICTY's juri sprudence, the men s rea would in all likelihood
be met becaus e the perpetrator intended the act and , in the normal course of
events, such act would cause severe pain or suffering.
Putting aside the United States for a moment , will the International
Criminal Court (ICC) assist in creating more consistency?
There are
presently 121 nations that are parties to the Rome Statute. Each of those
states is likely to ensure eventually that its definition s of crimes are
11
comparable to the ICC 's definitions.
If the ICC has that impa ct now on

medications due to discri minati on aga inst pers ons with HIV medical condition s).
30. Id. at 167.
31. Nott:. ho wever. that presently , there is significant variati on among nationa l
definitio ns of torture. Se e Julianne Harp er. Defining Torture: Bridging the Gap Between
Rhetoric and Rea lity, 49 SAN TA CLARA L. REV. 893, 9 14-920 (2009) (describing variations
in dome stic:definitions . such as a failure to define torture at all. differences in the meaning of
severe. and the absem:e or presence of a state action requirement) .
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121 stat es and is likely to have such an influence on more in the future as
more states become parties, it is usefu l to cons ider how the ICC define s the
mens rea for tortur e.
Torture can be the underlying act for eith er a crime against humanit y or
a war crime. For a crime again st humanity of torture , the men s rea is
intentional co nduct , since torture is d~fined in that manner. Tortur e as a
crime against humanit y requires the "intentional infliction" of harm. 32 War
cri mes are not defin ed with a men s rea for the infliction of the harm .33

32. Article 7 (I) (f), Statute of the Intern atio nal Crimin al Cou rt, Rome, an. 7 (2) (e),
July 17, 1998. 2187 U.N.T.S. 3, U.N. Doc. A/Conf .183/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute). The
cri me against humanit y of torture consist s of the follow ing element.~:
I. Th e per petrntor inflicted seve re physical or mental pain or sufferin g upo n one
or more persons.
2. Such perso n or persons we re in the cu stody or under the control of the
perpetra tor.
3. Such pain or suffering did not arise on ly from, and was not inherent in or
incide ntal to, lawf ul sanctions.
4 . The conduct was com mitted as part of a widespread or system atic attack
directed aga inst a c ivilian populat ion.
5. The perpetrator knew that the conduct wa s part of or intended the conduct to
be pan of a widesp read or systema tic attack directed against a civilian
po pulation.
International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes. available at http://www.icc-cpi.in!I
NR/rdon1yres/336923 D8-A6AD-40EC -AD7B-45B F9DE73D56/0/E lements0fCrimcs Eng.pdf.
33. There is a requi reme nt of an aware ness of the factual circumstances of the armed
conllic t and the status of the victims as protec ted perso ns for war crimes , hut that is not the
same as the mens rea with rega rd to the harm. The war cr ime of torture is de fined in the
Elements of Crimes as:
Article 8 (2) (a) (ii)- 1 War crime of tortur e
Eleme nts
I. The perpet rator inflicted severe physical or mental pa in or suffering upon one
or more person s.
2. T he perpetrator inflicted the pain or suffering for such purposes as: obta inin g
information or a confession. punishment, intimid ation or coe rcion or for any
reaso n hased on discri minatio n of any kind.
3. Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva
Con vention s of 1949.
4. The perpetrat or was awa re of the factua l circumstance s that estab lished that
pro tected status.
5. The conduct took place in the co ntext of and was assoc iated with an
intern ational ann ed conflict.
6. The perp etrator was aware of fact ual circumstan ces that established the
ex istence of an ann ed conflict.
Elements of Crimes. supra note 32. There are a couple of other key variations between
torture as a crime agains t humanity and torture as a war crim e. No speci fic purpose is
requi red for a crime agains t humanity of torture. but the specific purposes of obtaining a
confess ion, punishment , intimidati on. coer cion, or discrimin ation are required for war crimes
of torture. An additional differenc e hetween torture as a crim e against humanity and torture
as a war crime is that the victim must be in the custod y or under the control of the accused
for a cr ime against hum anity. but not for a war crime.
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Under the ICC statutory scheme, however , if there is no identified mens rea,
the statute provides that the default mens rea for crimes is "intent and
know ledge.",.. Moreover , the general provi sions of the Element s of Crimes
include a statement that when a "value jud gment," such as regarding
"severe " is an element, it is not generally necessary to establish that the
perpetrator made this judgment. This probably means that the perpetrat or
would not himself or herself have to specifically intend the severe harm ;
rather there would be an intent or knowledge mens rea with regard to the
act and the co nsequence would be the severe harm . If the interpretation
goes this route, the ICC 's definition would not require a specific intent
regarding the harm and, instead, would be virtually identical to the ICTY 's
approa ch. If states, even just the states parties, adopt the definitions of the
ICC, that would be a significant number of states in the world without a
35
specific intent limitation on the meaning of torture.

11. THE PROBLEM OF DIFFERING D EFINITIONS
The contrast between the U.S. statute and the ICTY decisions is
indicative of a problem in definition and applicati on. The mens rea, in
particular, may result in opposite conclusions in a given situation.
Although the prohibition of torture is viewed as customary international
law, there are no specific examples in the Conventi on of what constitutes
torture and the U.S . restriction s demon strate that there are difference s in
understanding what qualifies as torture.

34. The General introduction to the Elements of Crimes provides:
2. As stated in article 30, unless otherwise provid ed, a person shall be
crim inally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court only if the material clemenL-; are committed
with intent and knowledge . Where no reference is made in the Elements
of Crimes to a mental element for any particular conduct , consequence
or circumsta nce listed, it is under stood that the relevant mental element ,
i.e., intent, knowledge or both, set out in artic le 30 applie s. Exceptions to
the article 30 standard, hased on the Statute, including applicable law
under its releva nt provisions , are indicated below.
3. Existence of intent and knowledge can be inferred from relevant facts
and circumstances.
4. With respect to me ntal ele ments assoc iated with element s involving
valu e j udgement, such as those using lhe terms "i nhuman e" or "severe,"
it is not necessa ry that the perpetra tor personally completed a particular
value j udgement, unless otherwise indicated.
Elements of Crimes, J·upra note 32.
35. The ICC could, of course. have an impact of establi shing definiti ons different from
the Conve ntion. For example, one difference between the ICC definitions and the
Convention is that no involveme nt by a state is required for either a crime against humanity
or war cri me of torture under the ICC.

306

JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 6:291

It is appropriate to ask whether we need consistent definition s. The
answer is that the ramification s of different understandings of what
constitute torture could be extensive.
For exa mple , the Convention
prohibits extradition if an individual faces a risk of torture. Torture issues
also arise in deportation or rem oval proceedings. As noted above, the U.S.
court s are analyzing specific intent as a necessary element of torture in
removal pro ceed ings. Questions are likely to arise in the future whether a
state, such as the United States, violates the Convention if it extradites to a
country where torture occurs und er one definition but not under the
definition of the sending state. The same issue pertain s in removal
proceeding s. The United States appears to be returning individuals to
countries in which the U.S . courts acknowledge severe harm will occur but
in whi ch there is insufficient evidence of a "specific intent' ' to impose it.
While arguably consistent with the U.S. under sta nding of torture , this
application is, without question , at odds with the lCTY 's definition. How
should the compliance of the United States with the Torture Convention be
assessed if, under the more widely-accepted definiti on, the United States is
remo ving individuals to a country in which they will be tortured?
Another reason to be concerned with differing definitions is that torture
often involve s multiple states and possibly the need for multinational
action. As a conse quence, internati ona l relation s and bilateral or multilateral action s or decisions will be affected if the re is no agreement on the
definition. For example , the case invol ving Abu Om ar in Italy pose s such a
problem. He was abducted from Italy and sent to Egypt where he was
allegedly tortured. Both American CIA and Italian int elligence agents were
parties to the abduction and rendition . In a recent decision, an Italian court
convicted 23 CIA agents and 3 Italian agents of kidnapping in co nnection
If the case had been the subject of actual tort ure
with tbe cas e.''
proceedings, whose standard sho uld govern?
Under whose definition
should a decision be made to act to pro sec ute the perpetrators? The U.S.
1
37
standa.rd? The Italian standard? The Egyptian stan dard? R A related issue
36. Manuela D'Alcssandro & Daniel Flynn, hafy Convicrs Former CIA Agent~· in
Rendition Trial, REUTERS,Nov. 4, 2009 , available m http://www.reut ers.com/a rticle/id
USTRE5A33QB20091104 ; Rachel Don adio, Italy Conricrs 23, Most Working for C.1./\., r4
Abducting Muslim Cleric, N.Y. TIMES. Nov . 5, 2009, at A15.
37. The United States. Italy. and Egypt arc all parties to the Torture Convention .
38 . The Egyptian constitutional pro vis ion speaks only very generally, with no
definition of torture:
Any person arrested or detained or his freedom restraine d shall be treated in
the manner 1hat preserve his dignity. No physical or moral harm is to be
inflicted upon him . He may not be detained or imprisoned except in places
de fined by laws organizing prisons.
If a confe ss ion is proved to have been made by a person under any of the
aforementio ned forms of duress or coercion, it shall be considered invalid and
futile .
Constitution of 197 1 (as amended on March 26, 2007) . m •ailable or http:// www .apt.ch/
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arises if collaborative action is necessary. Much time could be lost debating
whether torture was at issue. Further, there is a danger of politic s playing
too large a role. Havin g one accepted interpretation would remove at least
some of the politics from the situation.
Another major reason for consistency is acco untability :~ A person
committing the same acts in one state may be guilty of torture in one state
but not in another . Thi s does not promo te a culture of accountability;
instead it is a culture of fortuity as to where one commits the acts.
Thi s is not to suggest that an overly broad interpretati on is required, ju st
a consistent one. An overly broad interpretation risks minimizing the
seriousness of the offense.

III.

AC COUNTABI LITY FOR TORT URE

The next question is, assumiug there is a workable, generally-accepted
interpretation of torture, what are the means of accountability? The Tort ure
1
Convention requires cri minali zing torture.4° extradition or prosecution,4 and
41
compensation for victims. It should be noted that states are not required to

index.ph p?op tion=com _ k2& view =item &layout=it em& id=8 l 9&1temid=266&1ang=en.
39. For furth er reasons for con sistency in definiti ons, see DAVID LUBAN, JULIE R.
O ' SUU.IVAN& DAVID P. STEWART, [NTERNATIONAL
AND TRANSNATIONAL
CRIMINALLAW
I 093-1094 (2010).
40. Article 5( l) provides:
Each State Party sha ll take suc h measures as may be necess ary to establish its
jurisdiction over the offences refetTed to in article 4 in the following cases:
(a) When the offence s are comm itted in any territory und er its juri sdiction
or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State:
(b) When the alleged offend er is a natio nal of that State ;
(c) When the victim is a national of that State if that State considers it
appropriate.
41. Article 7 provides:
I . The State Party in the territory und er whose jurisdiction a perso n alleged
to have committed any offe nce referr ed to in article 4 is found shall in
the cases contemplated in article 5, if it doe s not extradite him. suhmit
the case to its co mpete nt authorities for the purpose of prosec uti on.
2. These authorities sha ll take their decision in the same manner as in the
case of any ordinary offence of a serious natur e under the law of that
State. In the cases referred to in article 5, parag rap h 2, the standard s of
ev idenc e required for prosecution and convic tion shall in no way he less
stringen t than those which apply in the cases referred to in a1ticle 5,
panigraph l.
3. Any person regar ding whom proceedings are brought in connection with
any of the offences referred to in article 4 shall be guaranteed fair
treatment at all stages of the proceedings.
42. Article 14(1) states:
Each State Party shall ensure in its legal sys tem that the victim of an act of
torture obtains redr ess and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate
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implement universal juri sdiction; they must criminali ze only offenses
committed within their territory and when the alleged offender is a national
of that state. The Convention suggests, but does not mandate , criminalizing
torture when the victim is a national of the state. Clearly, a state could opt
for broader coverage than this or even universal jurisdiction.
The
Convention is the minimum required, not the maximum.
For civil
remedies , the Convention requires an "enforceable right to fair and
1
adequate compensation ."4·

A. Limitations on Remedies and Alternat ives
The question with regard to remedie s for torture, whether criminal or
civil, is whether they are effective or whether th ere are too many limitations
on the remedie s to make them a useful vehicle. In the United States, the
criminal statute is almo st unused and civil actions ha ve signific ant
limitations.
Limitation s in criminal actions include juri sdi ction and failure to use
the statute. The federa l statute limit s the crime to acts outside the United
States and provides for juri sdiction only if the alleged perpetrator is a U.S.
4
national or, regardles s of nationality , is present within the United States."
In other words, the statute does not cover torture committ ed within the
United State s. It does, however , cover U.S. nationals who commit torture
elsewhere in the world. The statute further has a broad reach in that there is
also juri sdiction over anyone who committed torture outside of the United
States, but is found within the United States.
Who could be pro secute d under this statute? Exampl es would include a
U.S. soldier who tortures a detainee in a foreign country; a U.S. civilian

43.

44.

compensat ion , including the means for as full rehabilitation as possib le. In the
eve nt of th e death of the victi m as a re sult of an act of tortur e, hi s dependants
[sic] shall be en titled to compensation.
Id .
18 V.S.C. §2340(a) (2006) provides:
A s used in this chapter (a) Off ense. Wh oever out side the United St ates co mmits or attemp ts to
commit tortur e shaJI be fined und er thi s title or imp riso ned no t more than 20
years, or both, and if death results to any person from co ndu ct prohibited by
this suh section, shall be puni shed by death or imprisoned for any ter m of
years or for life.
(b) Juri sdiction. Th ere is juri sdicti on over the activity prohibited in subsection
(a) if (I) the allege d offe nder is a national of the Un ited States; or
(2) the allege d offender is present in the U nited States. irrespective of the
nation ality of the victim or alleged offe nder .
(c) Conspiracy. A perso n who conspires to comm it an offe nse und er thi s
section sha ll be subjec t to the same penalties (oth er than the penalty of death )
as the pena lties presc ribed for the offe nse,
the com mission of which was the object of the conspiracy.
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who interrogates detainees with torture in a foreign country; and a foreign
national who has tortured people in his home country, but is present within
the United States.
Who cannot be pro secuted under this statute? One example is anyone
who commits torture within the United States. Another example would be a
foreign national who commits torture in his home country and remains
outside the United States. The latter example is not particularly disturbin g
as the person could undoubtedly be prosecut ed somewhere else more easily.
But the first one, a person who commit s torture within the United States ,
seems odd not to be cove red, especially since the Torture Convention
require s criminalizing conduct that is torture and occurs within the state's
own territory .
Apparently, the United State s thought that torture occurring within the
United States was covered by existing law s, such as murder, kidnapping ,
45
and similar crimes. While the acts underlying the torture may be punished
with lesser crimes, the question in this context would be whether there are
sufficient penalties for the lesser crimes. There is an additional question
whether this gap affects international relations.
Another related issue is whether the criminal statutes are actu ally
invoked. How often has the federal torture statute been used? One case in
which there might have been probable cause to believe torture occurred was
the abuse of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. The soldier s were
not, however, pro secuted for tortur e. Instead, they were prosecuted under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) for crimes such as
maltreatment of prisoners, assault, indecent acts, and dereliction of duty.
One of the most responsible , Spc. Graner , was sentenced to 10 years in
prison.*" Similarly, during the Vietnam War, Lt. Calley was not pro secuted
for torture for crimes committed in My Lai , although he was prosecuted for
murder. Regarding torture, howev er, the U.S. military has never prosecuted
anyone under the torture statute , nor have they prosecuted anyone for a war
crime of torture. One of the primary reason s for this is that the statutory

4 5. The federal statu te was amended in 2004 lo clarify that "ou tside the United States"
included places such as Guantanamo Bay. Afghanistan, and similar areas that are under the
control of the United States, but out5idc its territorial boundari es. See John Sifton. United States

Military and Central lntellige11ceAgency Personnel Ahroad: Plugging the Prosecutorial Gaps, 43
HARV . J. ON LEGIS. 487, 500-501 (2006) .

46.
United State s v. Graner, 69 M.J. 104, 105 (C.A.A .F. 2010). Graner was convicted of
maltreatment of persons suhject to his orde rs, con spiracy, assault, indecent acts and dereliction of
duty. Pfc. Lynndie England, shown in a number of the photographs. was sentenced to three years.
Others receive d sentences ranging from 6 months to 8 Y2years. Still others recei ved a discharge
or a reprimand. See Josh Whit e, Resen•ist Sentenced to 3 Years for Abu Ghraih Abuse, Pfc.

England Apologi::.esf or Photographed Mistreatment, Says Superior wul Lover 'Used' Her,
WASH. POST, Sept. 28. 2005. at Al 2.: David Dishneau, Ahu Ghraih Officer's Sentence:
Reprimand. WASti. POST, Aug . 29, 2007, available ut http://w ww.was hingtonpost. com/
wpd yn/contcnl/article/2007 /08/29/ AR200708290 I 038.htm.
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scheme of the UCMJ is set up with a preference to prosecute for an
enumerated offense. War crimes and torture are not enumerated offenses
47
and would have to be incorporated through an assimilation provision.
There are likely to be legal challenges to the use of an assimilated crime as
that provision is only to be invoked if enumerated offenses do not apply.
In civilian courts in the United States, only one prosecution has ever
occurred for torture under the federal statute. Chuckie Taylor , the son of
Charles Taylor, was convicted in federal court in Florida in October of 2008
for torture in Liberia and sentenced in December 2009 to 97 years in
4
prison. R Consequently , it would be fair to say that criminal prosecutions
for torture, rather than the underlying acts, are close to nonexistent.
Civil actions, on the other hand, are more common in the United States,
although these actions, too , have various limitation s. The civil actions are
most often brought under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and the Torture
Victim Protection Act (TVPA). The ATS is limited to foreign nationals as
plaintiffs. although the defendants can be either foreign or U.S. nationals. 49
The "torts" are limited to violations of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States. The courts have long considered torture such a "tort ," so the
nature of the cause of action is not a limitation, although the limitation on
who can be a plaintiff does constitute a significant restriction. The TVPA
has broader coverage as anyone, including U.S. citizens, may bring an
action. However, unlike the ATS, under which U.S. officials can be sued,
the TVPA authorizes actions only against those operating under color of
50
law of a foreign nation.
47.

Article 134 of lhe U.C.M.J., l O U.S.C. ~934 (2006) , provide s:
Though not specifica lly mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects
to the prejudi ce of good order and discipline in the armed forces. all co nduct
of a natu re to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses
not capital, of which persons subject to thi s chapter may be guilty. shall he
taken cognizance of by a general, special or summary court-martial.
according to the nature and degree of the off ense, and shall be puni shed at the
discretion of that court.
48. United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783,801 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 1511 (2011); see United States v. Emmanu el, Order on Defendant's Morion To Dismiss
rhe Indictment, 2007 WL 2002452 (S.D. Fla. 2007), for a descripti on of the charges and
factual allegations . The alleged torture included "repeatedly burnin g the victim's flesh with
a hot iron. forcing the victim at gunpoint to hold scalding water. hurning other parts of the
victim's flesh with scalding water, repeatedl y shocking the victim's genitalia and other body
parts with an electrical de vice, and rubbing salt into the victim's wounds. while the victim
was within the Defendant's custody and physical control . . .. "
49. 28 U.S .C.A. § l 350 (2006 ) provides: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nation s or a treaty of the United States."
50. The Act, which is codified as a note to 28 U.S.C. § I 350 (2006 ), provides:
(a) Liahility. - An individual who, under actual or apparent authority , or color of
law , of any foreign nation (I) subjects an individual to tortur e shall. in a civil action. be liable fur damages to
that individual; or
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Typical actions under the ATS and TVPA include foreign citizens
bringing actions against foreign individuals or governments. For example ,
Bosnian Muslim citizens brought an action under ATS and TVPA against
Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb political leader who is now on trial at the ICTY,
51
for genocide, war crimes, and crime s against humanity. Another example
is a case in which Somali citizens have brought an action against Samantar,
the former first vice president and minister of defense in Somalia, for
52
torture and extrajudicial killin gs during his time in office. There are also
ATS actions brought by foreign citizens against U.S. officials, such as
Guantanam o detainees suing the Secretary of Defen se and other officers.
Cases against U.S. official s are often dismissed , however, on the basis of
qualified immunit y?
As a side note that is of interest in examining definitions of torture , the
definiti on under the TVPA pro vides that torture occurs when the acts are
"intention ally inflicted" for one of the enumerated purposes.54 This is the

(2) subjec ts an individual to extrajudicial kill ing shall, in a ci vil action, be liable
for dam ages to the individu al' s lega l representative, or to any person who may be a
claimant in an action for wrongful deat h.
(b) Exhaustion of remedi es. - A court shall decl ine to hear a claim under this
section if the cla imant has not ex hausted adequa te and available remedies in the
place in which the co nduct givin g rise to the claim occurred .
(c) Statut e of limitations. ~ No action shall be maintained und er this section unless
it is comm enced within 10 years after the cause of action arose.
51. A defa ult ju dgme nt was entered agai nst Karadzic , with a j ury award of $4.5 billion
in compen satory and puniti ve dam ages. Doe v. Karad zic, 192 F.R.D. 133 (S. D.N.Y. 2000)
(judgment); Center for Co nstitutional Rights, http ://ccrjustice.o rg/o urcases/ past-cases/ doe-v .karadzic (discussion of case and amount ); Doe v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 878, jud gment
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2000) (damage awards), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Karadzi c
Jud gme nt.pdf.
52. Samanta r v. Yousuf.. 130 S . Ct. 2278 (20 10).
53. See Padill a v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 201 2) (action bro ught by U.S. citizen
based on U.S. Co nstitution and Relig ious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA); dismissed on
qualifi ed immunit y grounds); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D .C. Cir . 2009) (actio n brou ght
by four British nationals under ATS, Bivens , and RFRA; ATS counts dismissed for failure to
exhaust remedies under Federal Tort Claim s Act against a U.S. official acting within scope
of employment; Bivens counts dismissed on ground s of qualifi ed immuni ty; RFRA claim s
dis missed on gro unds plaintiffs are not protected perso ns under the Act); see also Ali v.
Rum sfeld, 649 F .3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2011 ) (Iraqi and Afghani civilians brought action against
Rumsfe ld and other officials under 5th and 8th amendment s, Bivens, and the Ge neva
Co nventions; charges dismissed due to qualifi ed immunit y and, for Bivens claim, "specia l
factor" of ob structin g national security policy).
54. The TV PA defines torture as follows:
( I) the term 'tort ure' mea ns any act, directed against an individual in the
offe nder's custody or physica l control , by which severe pain or suffering (other
than pain or suffering arising only fro m or inherent in. or incidental to, lawful
sanctions), wheth er ph ysical or mental, is intention ally inflicted on that individual
for such purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third pers on informat ion or
a confession, punishing that individual for an act that individual or a third person
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same language that is in the Torture Convention.
The modifier
"specifically" is not part of the definition of torture under the TVPA. No
cases to my knowledge have yet explored this difference or its
55
significance.
Thus, even within one country - the United States - the
definitions are different.
Despite the availability of A TS and TVPA civil actions, there have not
56
One of the issues that
been many successful cases under these statutes.
hinders cases is unre solved questions surrounding official immunity. Many
of the ATS/TVPA cases involve actions against former government
officials who orchestrated the torture of citizens. These officials routinely
claim immunity from civil actions. Although the U.S. Supreme Court
recently held in Samantar v. Yousuf that the Foreign Sovereign Immunitie s
Act (FSIA) covers states, not individuals, the Court remanded the
ATS/TVPA case for resolution of issues of individual immunity under the
57
common law and customary international law. Individual immunity for
sitting or former government official s is an area in which there are
significant unresolved issues, including whether immunity exists for
international crimes , such as torture , if done in an official capacity, and
8
whether a former official is entitled to immunity5
has committed or is suspected of having committed, intimidating or coercing that
individual or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kjnd;
and
(2) mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting
from(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or
suffering;
(B) the admini stration or application, or threatened admini stration or applic ation,
of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly
the ~enses or the personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death ; or
(D) the threat that another individual will imminently be subjected to death, severe
phy sical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind altering
substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or
personality .
55. For example, the jury instructions from one case simply state "intentionally inflict"
- the language of the TVPA statute. Jury Instructi ons at 9. Romagoz a Arce v. Garcia, 434
F.3d 1254 ( 1 lth Cir. 2006), a1•ailable al http://ww w.cja.org/downloads/Romagoza_Jury _
Instructi ons_242.pdf. See also supra note 53 (providing citations on qualifi ed immunity).
56. For an unofficial list of case s, see http://viewfr omll2.co m/2009/l l/l l/alien-tortstatute-cases-re sulting-in-plaintiff-victories /.
57. Samantar v. Yousuf .. 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2292 -2293 (2010). On remand, the district
court found. on the basis of a determination submitted to the court by the U.S. State
Department, that Samantar 's common law immunity claim was no longer before the court.
Yousuf v. Samantar, 2011 WL 7445583 (E.D. Va. Feb. 15, 2011). For the determination by
the State Department that was submitted to the court, see Statement of Intere st of the United
States of America , available at http://www.c ja.org/downlo ads/S amantar_Stm t_of_ Interest.
pdf.
58. See di scussion in David P. Stewart, Sumanrar v. Yousuf, Foreign Official
Immunity Under Common Law, vol. 14 Issue 15. June 14, 2010 , available at http://www .
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Another issue that precludes civil accountability is the "state secrets"
9
doctrine. Pur suant to this doctrine, either the case itself may be barred s or
evidence may be privileged and not admissible .60 The underlying reasoning
is that the government may invoke "state secrets" if national security would
be threatened by revealing the information to the public. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals has defined state secrets as whether "from all the
circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion
of the evidence will expose ... matters which , in the interest of national
61
In a recent case, the Ninth Circuit
security, should not be divulged ."
applied this standard to an action against an American corporation,
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., that had allegedly assisted the government in
62
The plaintiffs alleged
extraordinary renditions that resulted in torture.
torture in Morocco , Egypt, and Afghanistan through the arrangement
between Jeppesen and the CIA. The plaintiffs were an Egyptian national,
an Italian national, an Iraqi national who was a legal resident of the United
Kingdom, and two Ethiopian nationals, one of whom was a legal resident of
the United Kingdom. They were purportedly handed over to the Americans
by the Swedish , Pakistani, Gambian, and Jordanian governments. The
torture allegations include severe beating s, electrocution, sleep and food
deprivation, threats of sexual abuse, unceasing loud noise such as screams,
and the pouring of stinging liquid into open wounds. The court held that
plaintiffs' case should be dismissed under the state secrets doctrine. While
not deciding if the case should be categorically barred on the basis of the
subject matter of the case, the court held that application of the evidentiary
version of the doctrine required dismissal under the circumstances of this
case. Even though some of the plaintiffs' evidence was public, the court
found that the case could not go forward "without creating an unjustifiable
63
risk of divulging state secrets."
The legal questions surrounding immunity and state secrets illustrate
two of the possible limitation s on the effectiveness of civil actions for
accountability in the United States. If the avenues for accountability are
limited in the United States , what about in other international and national
forums? As mentioned earlier, the international criminal courts are not a
venue in which many cases can be adjudicated . There are, however, cases
that were brought or are ongoing through universal jurisdiction in France ,
Germany and Spain against American government officials. 64 However, the
asil.org/insights 100614.cfm.
59. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1876).
60. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953).
61. Mohamed v. Jeppe sen Dataplan, Inc ., 6i4 F 3.d 1070, 1081 (9th Cir. 2010}, cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (20 11).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1087.
64 . Katherine Gallagher, Universal Jurisdiction in Practice: Efforts To Hold Donald
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cases in France and Germany did not go forward. In France, there was a
determination that former Secretary of the Defense Rumsfeld would have
65
immunity. There was also a decision not to proceed with a criminal
investigation in a 2004 case in Germany involving Iraqi detainees in Iraq,
largely out of deference to letting the U.S. proceed first. A second case ,
brought in 2006 in Germany involving 11 Iraqi detainees and one Saudi
detainee at Guantanamo, similarly resulted in a deci sion not to pur sue an
investigation largely on the basis that there was no connection with
Germany and the accused were not likely to be in Germany. b6
Spain appears to be an exception in that two cases, both recently
instituted in 2009, are pending. One case is brought against six Bush
7
administration lawyers (including Bybee and Yoo). ~ The other case was
brought by four former Guantanamo detainees, one of whom is a Spanish
6
citizen and another who is a longtime Spanish resident. ~ There is recent
legislation that limits the reach of Spanish jurisdiction to cases that involve
a Spanish national or a suspect who is in Spanish territory before the
investigation commences, but it does not affect the se cases. 69
While universal juri sdiction is admirable , clearly there are political and
resource issues that each country must assess, especially when there is no
connection with nationals or the territory of that country. That is why
actions as in the Italian prosecution are particularly essential. In that action,
there was a clear connection to Italy since the abduction occurred on Italian
70
soil. The commencement of the acts leading to torture was in Milan. Italy
Rwn,1j'eldand Other High-Level United States Officials Accountable for Torture, 7 J. INT' L
CRIM.Jt;ST. 1087, 1109 (2009).
65. Id. at 111 I.
66. Id. at 1102, 1105.
67. The others being sued are Alberto Gonzales, who was the Attorney General ;
Douglas Feith, who was the former Undersecretary of Defen se for Policy; William Haynes ,
who was the Defense Department' s ge neral counsel; and David Addington, who was Vice
President Cheney's chief of staff. This case was stayed in April 2011 and referred to the
U.S. Department of Justice ; that decision, howev er, is being appealed to the Span ish
Supreme Court.
The proceedings are described on the website of the Center for
Constitutional Rights (CCR), http://ccrjusti ce.o rg/spai n-us-torture-ca~e.
68. Gallagher. supra note 64, at 1113. The case is proceeding, following a decision in
January 2012 that the court ha s jurisdiction. CCR website, supra note 67.
69. Andrew Morgan, Spain Lower House Votes To Limit Reach of Universal
Jurisdiction Stotute, JURIST, June. 25, 2009, http ://jurist.law.pitt.edu/papercha se/2009/0 6/
spa in-lower-house-votes -to-limit-reach.php; Thoma s Catan , Spain ls Moving To Rein In lt~Crusading Judges; Congress Aims To Limit Human-Rights Inquiries, Such as the One
Probing Torture Allegations at Guantanamo Bay, WALLST. 1., May 20, 2009, at A6; Soeren
Kern, Spain Changes Tack 011 Universal Jurisdiction, BRUSSELSJOURNAL,June l , 2009.
available at http ://www.bru sselsjo urnal.com/node/ 3945.
70. See Francesco Messineo, Extraordinary Renditions· and Swte Ohligatiom· To
Criminalize and Prosecute Torture in the Light of the Abu Omar Case in Italy. 7 J. lNT'L
CRIM.Jusr. I 023, 1023 (2009) (the action in Italy was the crime of "seque stro di persona''
which Messineo translates as ab<luction, although he also translate s the indictment as
"kidnapped ").
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could have, however, turned a blind eye to these actions because the actual
torture occurred in Egypt. It is highly significant that an Italian cornt took
this step to hold the individuals accountable for the actions that resulted in
torture.
The various cases, from the United States, France, Germany, Spain,
Italy, and the international criminal courts point out how inconsistent our
attempts are at regulating and providing accountability for torture. The
combination of varying definitions and inconsistent enforcement should be
of concern in the actual implementation of the Torture Convention.
Certainly, there are criminal prosecutions of individuals for torture, either
as a crime in and of itself or as a form of a war crime or a crime against
humanity. Criminal prosecutions also occur for the underlying conduct or
related conduct, even if it is not denominated torture. The Italian case is an
example of this with a prosecution for kidnapping. The typical courtmartial in the United States is another example where the prosecution is for
maltreatment of prisoners or other similar crimes. There can be, however,
great hesitation in prosecuting for torture. We have seen it with the Obama
administration's reaction to whether or not to prosecute the interrogators or
11
other officials under the Bush administration.
The dismissal of
A TS/TVPA cases on immunity or state secrets grounds derails
accountability efforts. Similarly, the dismissal of actions under universal
jurisdiction, as in France and Germany, indicates a reluctance to go forward
with the cases.
B. Steps for the Future

There is a need for clarification of the definitions and an imperative for
an international effort at coordinating both prosecution and compensation
cases for torture. Limitations on civil and criminal remedies include
jurisdictional, definitional, and political restrictions. There is inconsistency
in criminal prosecutions in national courts and in the availability of civil
remedies. While the ICC may provide some leadership in this area once
they have cases alleging torture as a war crime or a crime against humanity,
it is clear that most criminal adjudications of torture will occur in national
courts. Moreover, there may be reasons to differentiate definitions in
criminal and civil contexts and the ICC cannot provide guidance on civil
actions. Further research is needed to document standards for criminal and

71. Gallagher, supra note 64, at 1099 (Holder ordered a preliminary invi::stigation and
special counsel was appointed August 24, 2009. As of July 16, 2010, the spi::dal counsel had yet
to issue a report. See http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/limestopics/organizations/c/
central_intclligcncc_agcncy/cia_interrogati ons/index.html ?scp= I&sq=investigation%20CIA %20i
nterrogators&st=cse.
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civil cases of torture and to track outcomes of civil cases. There also may
be differentials in state as opposed to individual accountability standards.
At the outset of this article, I posed two questions. The first question
was why there is a need for greater consistency in the definition of torture.
Although torture can occur within national boundaries, there is a
transnational characteristic involved as perpetrators flee to other countries
when they are deposed or uncovered and as states begin to coordinate
efforts to combat torture. Additionally, there are international bodies that
either adjudicate or monitor torture. Without a common understanding of
what constitutes torture, international efforts in prosecution, extradition, and
regulation are likely to be obstructed or delayed. It is surely a lesson of the
recent past in the United States that definitions do matter. The definitional
issues of "severe physical or mental pain or suffering" and "intent" are
examples of how different definitions can be and what a difference those
definitions make in conclusions about torture.
The second question was what impediments exist to effective remedies
for torture. Impediments include definitional issues, but also jurisdictional
and other limitations , such as immunity. There is a need to revisit the
efficacy of our criminal and civil actions on national levels to make those
responsible accountable for torture or the Convention does not stand for
much.
The need for greater national procedures for investigating ,
prosecuting, and providing reparations for torture is a clear theme in the UN
72
Special Rapporteur on Torture's report from February 2010. The report
noted:
Although 146 States are party to the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ,
most Governments have failed to effectively implement its
provisions. Despite the obligation to criminalize torture and
prosecute perpetrators of torture under different types of
jurisdiction, only very few torturers have been brought to justice
worldwide. Impunity continues to be one of the main factors in
widespread torture. Despite the obligation to provide victims of
torture with an effective remedy and adequate reparation for the
harm suffered, only a very small number of victims of torture are
able to enjoy this right in the country responsible for inflicting the
73
torture.

72. Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or puni shment, Manfred Nowak , to the United Nations Human Rights Council , 9
February 2010 , available at http://www2.ohchr.org/engli sh/bodieslhrcouncil/doc s/ 13 session/AHRC-13 -39.pdf.
73. Id. at 19.
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While national remedies are essential, it is also clear that torture goes
beyond borders, and that a reconsideration of definitions and remedies is
needed for the sake of those subject to torture and for the sake of
international cooperation in combating torture.

